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Limitations of Sovereign Immunity Under the Clean Water 
Act: Empowering States To Confront Federal Polluters 
Corinne Beckwith Yates 
When it comes to polluting the environment, "some of the worst 
offenders are our own Federal facilities," Vice President George Bush 
said in a 1988 presidential campaign speech.1 Promoting himself as 
the "environmental president," Bush urged that "[t]he government 
should live within the laws it imposes on others."2 Private chemical 
companies, steel manufacturers, and paper mills embody the stere-
otypical image of this country's worst polluters. Most often over-
looked, however, are agencies within the federal government itself. In 
1989, the General Accounting Office reported that federally owned fa-
cilities - such as shipyards, nuclear weapons plants, laboratories, and 
military bases - violated clean water regulations twice as often as 
private firms and that forty percent of federal violators were noncom-
pliant for a year or longer. 3 Congress has adopted stringent standards 
to combat the problems of solid waste, 4 hazardous materials, 5 and 
water6 and air pollution.7 Holding the federal government accounta-
ble to its own laws, however, has proved difficult. Federal agencies 
generally are subject to sanctions only to the extent Congress unam-
biguously waives sovereign immunity.8 Yet Congress did not express 
its intent uniformly in the waiver provisions of the major federal envi-
ronmental laws. The result is a confused amalgam of statutes that 
address, but fail to clearly delimit, the government's sovereign 
immunity. 
1. 135 CoNG. REc. H3894 (daily ed. July 19, 1989). Bush was quoted in the comments of 
Rep. Thomas Luken on consideration of H.R. 1056, the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 
1989, which clarified the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988). 
2. 135 CoNG. REc. at H3894. 
3. GAO Says Federal Facilities Are Major Water Polluters, L.A. TlMEs, Jan. 15, 1989, at 14, 
col. 1. The GAO study also noted that federal agencies place minimal emphasis on compliance 
with antipollution laws and that the Environmental Protection Agency and state regulators pur-
sued "timely enforcement actions against federal facilities in only eight of the [forty-six] cases in 
which" action was required. Id. 
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). 
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). 
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act), 33 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
7. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). 
8. Block v. North Dakota ex rel Board of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983) 
(A waiver of sovereign immunity must be express.). 
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The Clean Water Act9 is one such statute. The original Act and, 
to a greater extent, its subsequent amendments, evince congressional 
intent to make federal agencies responsible for pollution. Section 
l323(a), which defines agencies' obligations under the Act, subjects 
federal entities to the Act's requirements and sanctions to the same 
extent as private polluters.10 Yet a limitation to this broad sovereign 
immunity waiver obscures that aim: section 1323(a) waives sovereign 
immunity only for those civil penalties that arise under federal law. 11 
Thus, environmental groups, states, and individuals suing as private 
attorneys general have been relatively effective under the Clean Water 
Act's citizen suit provision,12 as that provision's penalties are part of 
the Act's own provisions and undoubtedly arise under federal law.13 
States, however, face great impediments when they seek to impose 
civil penalties under state-operated programs that transfer enforce-
ment of some of the Clean Water Act's provisions to the states.14 
These programs, designed as part of the Clean Water Act's com-
plex National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),15 al-
9. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
10. Section 1323(a) reads, in part: 
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of the Federal Government .•• and each officer, agent, or employee thereof in the 
performance of his official duties, shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, 
interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions re-
specting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and to the same 
extent as any nongovernmental entity including the payment of reasonable service charges. 
The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or proce· 
dural ..• , (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative authority, and 
(C) to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any 
other manner. This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity of such agencies, 
officers, agents, or employees under any law or rule of law. 
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). 
11. "[T]he United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal 
law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court." 33 
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). See Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 
1990) (holding that the Department of Energy is subject to civil penalties arising under federal 
law), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). But see McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation 
(MESS) v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (ruling that the Clean Water Act 
does not waive sovereign immunity for any civil penalties, including those arising under federal 
law). MESS. a case that has been widely criticized, is discussed in note 89 infra. 
12. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421, 1424-29 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Ohio v. 
United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990) (suit allowed under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act's analogous citizen suit provision), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 
(1991); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988). The Clean Water Act citizen suit provision allows citizens to 
file complaints against any person alleged to be in violation of an efiluent standard or limitation 
or an order issued by the EPA or a state with regard to such a standard or limitation. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(a)(l) (1988). In authorizing citizen suits, Congress expressly provided for civil penalties 
- up to $25,000 a day. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988). See generally Michael D. Axline et al., 
Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LmG. 1 (1987). 
13. See Sierra Club, 931 F.2d at 1427 ("Because this [citizen suit] is based on alleged viola-
tions of a ... permit issued by the EPA, it arises under federal law."). 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988); see infra Part II. 
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low and, in fact, require states to penalize polluters that exceed 
allowable pollutant discharge levels under the Act.16 Specifically, 
under the NPDES, either the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) or the state (when it assumes administration of the 
NPDES program) issues permits to polluters, allowing the discharge 
of pollutants within strict permit conditions, and imposes penalties 
when permit holders violate the conditions of their permits. States 
prefer to penalize polluters using sanctions developed under the Act's 
state-operated programs, as opposed to those under the citizen suit 
provision, because the fines imposed in citizen suits are payable to the 
federal government rather than to the states.17 
The penalties states seek under the NPDES state-operated pro-
grams, although integral to the federal Act, arise, in at least one 
court's view, under state instead of federal law.18 If this is the case, 
sovereign immunity deprives states of an effective weapon ordinarily 
available to enforce the Clean Water Act against federal agencies, be-
cause the sovereign immunity waiver is limited to penalties arising 
under federal law. Accordingly, this would restrict states' enforce-
ment actions to citizen suits, thereby diminishing their incentive and 
their financial capacity to abate federal agencies' pollution, leaving no 
meaningful deterrent to federal agencies. 
This Note considers whether civil penalties that states impose on 
federal agencies for violations of NPDES permits arise under federal 
law and thus are covered by the Clean Water Act's waiver of sovereign 
immunity - an issue the Supreme Court is scheduled to address dur-
ing the 1991 term.19 Part I outlines the history of the Clean Water 
Act, discussing Supreme Court decisions and statutory amendments 
that affect the sovereign immunity provision. Part II explains the 
mechanics of the NPDES state permit process and examines, through 
analysis of statutory provisions, the degree of control retained by the 
EPA over individual states operating approved NPDES programs. 
Part III canvasses judicial treatment of the sovereign immunity ques-
tion: the Ninth Circuit has ruled that states cannot impose civil penal-
ties on federal agencies because those penalties arise under state law,20 
while the Sixth Circuit has held that states can impose such penalties 
16. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(b) (1988). 
17. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. l, 14 
n.25 (1981) (civil penalties assessed in Clean Water Act citizen suits payable to the federal 
government). 
18. California v. United States Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988). See section 
111.B for further discussion of this case. 
19. See Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 
lll s. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
20. California v. United States Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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because they arise under federal law.21 Finally, Part IV argues that 
resolution of this question should turn primarily on the statutory lan-
guage and framework of the Clean Water Act, as opposed to its convo-
luted legislative history. The Note concludes that, given the extent of 
federal oversight and the practical implications of the unusual hybrid 
arrangement, state-imposed civil penalties arise under federal law. 
Federal agencies, therefore, should be subject to state-imposed penal-
ties for violations of NPDES permits. 
I. HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER Ac:r 
By the late 1970s, Congress had passed a series of stringent federal 
environmental standards in an attempt to arrest the massive environ-
mental damage perpetrated in previous decades. The laws' aims were 
ambitious. The Clean Air Act, for example, sought to protect air 
quality and "initiate and accelerate a national research and develop-
ment program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollu-
tion,"22 while the Clean Water Act enunciated a national goal "that 
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated . 
. . . "
23 Each of the major statutes - the Clean Air Act, 24 the Clean 
Water Act,25 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA),26 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)27 - contains a provision 
waiving sovereign immunity to some extent.28 The question remains: 
To what extent? Whether wittingly or otherwise, Congress has cre-
ated a network of environmental statutes whose lack of uniformity de-
fies comparative analysis and whose equivocality confounds those 
seeking evidence of a clear waiver. 
21. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 
s. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
22. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b) 
(West Supp. 1991)). 
23. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567, 1575 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988)). 
24. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). 
25. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
26. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). 
27. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). 
28. The breadth of these waivers varies. For example, the Clean Air Act's waiver is the 
broadest, subjeeting federal facilities and personnel to all state and local air pollution require-
ments, substantive and procedural, and to the same criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions 
that private polluters face. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). The Clean Air Act 
provides for "as broad a waiver of sovereign immunity as is found in any of the environmental 
statutes." Michael Donnelly & James G. Van Ness, The Warrior and the Druid - the DOD and 
Environmental Law, 33 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 37, 38 (1986). RCRA, on the other hand, contains 
the most narrow waiver language, requiring federal facilities to comply only with "require-
ments." 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988); see infra seetion III.A.2. 
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A. Early Judicial Interpretations of Environmental Legislation 
In 1976, two major Supreme Court cases resolved some questions, 
at least temporarily, by narrowly interpreting the breadth of the 
waiver in two environmental statutes. Hancock v. Train 29 and EPA v. 
California ex rel State Water Resources Control Board, 30 companion 
cases addressing the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, respectively, 
restricted the sovereign immunity waivers in those acts to encompass 
only substantive standards, such as effiuent limitations and compliance 
schedules, as opposed to procedural standards, such as the require-
ment that federal installations obtain discharge permits.3 1 In Han-
cock, the State of Kentucky sought an injunction impelling federal 
polluters in that state, namely the Army, the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, and the Atomic Energy Commission, to obtain operating per-
mits under the Clean Air Act's analogue to the Clean Water Act's 
NPDES permit system. 32 The EPA had approved Kentucky's imple-
mentation plan,33 which essentially stated that no one could pollute 
the air "unless a permit therefor ha[d] been issued ... and [was] cur-
rently in effect."34 Despite the Clean Air Act's waiver provision, 
which, as of 1972, required federal facilities to "comply with Federal, 
State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abate-
ment of air pollution,"35 the Court ruled that Congress did not unam-
biguously declare that federal facilities required a permit to operate. 36 
Likewise, in State Water Resources Control Board, the Court rea-
soned that although the Clean Water Act obliged federal water pol-
luters to comply with state "requirements respecting control and 
abatement of pollution," securing a permit from a state with an EPA-
approved program was not one of those requirements. 37 In that case, 
the states of California and Washington challenged the EPA adminis-
trator's position that states lacked authority to require federal facilities 
to obtain permits. The Court ruled in favor of the EPA, narrowly 
interpreting the word "requirement" to exclude state NPDES permit 
29. 426 U.S. 167 (1976). 
30. 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
31. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 198-99; State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 215, 227. 
32. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 172-76; see infra Part II. 
33. Similar to the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act allows states to assume enforcement 
of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1988). Thus, under§ 7407(a), each state would submit to the 
EPA a plan detailing how the state would maintain and implement the Act's air quality stan-
dards. See also Hancock, 426 U.S. at 169-70. 
34. 426 U.S. at 173 (quoting Kentucky's implementation plan submitted to the EPA, which 
included this language from the Kentucky Air Pollution Control Commission Regulation No. 
AP-1, § 5(1)). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418(a) (West Supp. 1991)). 
36. 426 U.S. at 198. 
37. 426 U.S. at 212-13 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. IV 1970)). 
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standards. 38 "Should it be the intent of Congress to have the BP A 
approve a state NPDES program regulating federal . . . point 
sources,"39 the Court said, "it may legislate to make that intention 
manifest."40 So Congress did. 
B. The Initial Legislative Response 
Congress promptly repudiated the Supreme Court's narrow con-
struction by amending the language in both the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act to expand the extent to which the Acts' provisions 
included federal polluters.41 The revised Clean Water Act, instead of 
merely subjecting federal agencies to "requirements," exacted a 
broader federal obligation. The 1977 version, which. remains in force 
today, reads: 
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of the Federal Government ... shall be sub-
ject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local 
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions re-
specting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity . . • . [This 
obligation applies] to any requirement whether substantive or procedural 
... , to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative author-
ity, and ... to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, 
State, or local courts .... 42 
The amendment furnishes strong evidence of congressional intent to 
treat the federal government essentially like private polluters. Accord-
ing to the Senate report on the amendments, Congress amended the 
Act to "indicate unequivocally" that federal facilities were "subject to 
all of the provisions of state and local pollution laws."43 This was 
Congress' intent in 1972, but "the Supreme Court, encouraged by Fed-
eral agencies, ha[d] misconstrued the original intent" in Hancock and 
State Water Resources Control Board. 44 In the face of judicial set-
backs, then, the amendments provided states with a legislative solution 
to close one loophole that had allowed federal polluters to avoid envi-
38. 426 U.S. at 227. 
39. Point sources under the Clean Water Act are "any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance[s] ••. from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) 
(1988). 
40. 426 U.S. at 227-28. 
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418(a) (West Supp. 1991) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) 
(Clean Water Act). The Clean Water Act's legislative history states that the amendment "clari-
fies [section 1323(a)] to provide that all Federal facilities must comply with all substantive and 
procedural requirements of Federal, State, or local water pollution control laws." S. REP. No. 
370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4392. 
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The Clean Air Act waiver language also 
was changed to require compliance with any "requirement[s] whether substantive or procedural" 
and to include "process and sanction[s]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 7418(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
43. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4392. 
44. Id. 
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ronmental requirements under the Clean Water Act. A more stub-
born barrier to the enforcement ability of the states, however, involved 
the sovereign immunity waiver's limitation to penalties arising under 
federal law - a problem inextricably bound up with the mechanics of 
the NPDES state permit process. 
II. THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE 
ELIMINATION SYSTEM 
The NPDES program is a complex statutory system through 
which pollutant dischargers obtain permits allowing them to release 
some pollutants under strict permit conditions. Because it is the viola-
tion of these permit conditions that leads to the sanctions that are the 
subject of this Note, an understanding of the NPDES scheme is cru-
cial. Part II discusses in detail the NPDES permit program. Section 
II.A focuses on the origins and basic procedures of the NPDES. Sec-
tion II.B analyzes the distribution of permit authority and the degree 
of control the EPA retains over state permit programs. 
A. Dynamics of the NPDES Permit Program 
In its formative stage, pollution control legislation proceeded from 
the assumption that the promulgation and enforcement of measurable 
quality standards would achieve satisfactory pollution abatement. The 
current Clean Water Act's precursor - which Congress expressly de-
vised "to enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to 
establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement 
of water pollution"45 - evinced this theory. This legislative approach 
to reduce pollution, however, merely demonstrated the ineffectiveness 
of water quality standards. 46 Thus, Congress shifted its objective away 
from the tolerance of acceptable pollution levels to the complete elimi-
nation of pollutant discharge into navigable waters. 47 
In pursuit of this objective, Congress designed the Clean Water 
Act to eliminate all pollution of navigable waters by making the act of 
polluting the nation's waterways, rather than the results of the dis-
charge, the actionable offense. 48 The cornerstone of this ambitious 
program is contained in 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which boldly states that 
45. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970). 
46. Indeed, Congress ultimately concluded that "the Federal water pollution control pro-
gram ... has been inadequate in every vital aspect •.•• " S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674; see also EPA v. California ex rel State Water Re-
sources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976) (''The problems stemmed from the character of 
the standards themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects rather than the preventable 
causes of water pollution •••• "). 
47. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988)). 
48. 33 u.s.c § 1251 (1988). 
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"the discharge of any pollutants ... shall be unlawful. "49 After pro-
claiming this sweeping ban on pollutant discharge, Congress carved 
out an exception for instances where compliance with the otherwise 
impervious ban was not "technologically and economically achieva-
ble."50 Specifically, Congress incorporated a provision outlining the 
NPDES.51 
Under the NPDES regime, facilities exceptionally burdened by the 
complete proscription of pollutant discharges may obtain permits al-
lowing them to release specified levels of pollutants. Those exempted 
still must employ the best practical control technology available in 
meeting permit requirements. 52 To obtain a permit, such facilities also 
must meet requirements of the Act that mandate monitoring equip-
ment, allow inspections, and, most significantly, impose effi.uent limita-
tions53 on the amounts of pollutants discharged as specified in section 
1342(a)(l). That section provides that "the [EPA] Administrator 
may, after opportunity for public hearingL] issue a permit for the dis-
charge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding 
section 1311(a) ... upon condition that such discharge will meet ... 
all applicable requirements" set forth throughout the Clean Water 
Act. 54 An NPDES permit thus explicitly incorporates a discharger's 
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). The current Act prohibits the "discharge of pollutants," 
while the former language focused on "pollution." The discharge of pollutants is "the addition 
of materials in any quantity to the nation's waters," while pollution is "a demonstrable effect on 
an aquatic environment." Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean 
Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 874 (1986). 
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1988). 
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the 
Supreme Court explained that "{efi•ery point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by 11 
permit, which directly subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established by 
Congress to achieve its goals." 451 U.S. at 318 (footnote omitted); see also Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that legislative 
history clearly shows Congress intended the NPDES permit to be the only means by which a 
discharger of pollutants may escape the total prohibition of discharges stated in § 1311(a)). 
52. See Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Envt. v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902, 
908 (W.D. Penn. 1980), affd., 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981) (holders of NPDES permit bound to 
employ best practical control technology currently available in meeting requirements of permit, 
and whether they complied with terms of their application or project specifications did not ex-
cuse them from fulfilling conditions of permit). 
53. An effiuent limitation is "any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on 
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents 
which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of a contiguous zone, 
or the ocean, including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1988). 
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988). Those requirements include provisions addressing effiuent 
limitations generally, 33 U.S.C § 1311 (1988); water-quality-related effiuent limitations, 33 
U.S.C. § 1312 (1988); national standards of performance, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1988); toxic and 
pretreatment effiuent standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988); records, reports, and inspections, 33 
U.S.C. § 1318 (1988); and ocean discharge criteria, 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988). Under a 1987 
amendment to the Act, Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 404(d), 101 Stat. 7, 69 
(1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.), the Administrator may issue 11 
permit if the discharge meets either the applicable requirements under the noted sections or 
"prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such 
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general responsibilities under the Clean Water Act. ss 
Absent state participation, s6 dischargers obtain NPDES permits 
directly from the federal EPA. The EPA may undertake enforcement 
action - including levying administrative, civil, and criminal sanc-
tions - against permit holders who fail to comply with permit condi-
tions. s7 Private citizens also can pursue civil actions "against any 
person ... who is alleged to be in violation of ... an effiuent standard 
or limitation . . . or . . . an order issued . . . with respect to such a 
standard or limitation."ss In cases where citizens prevail, courts may 
order injunctive relief or "apply any appropriate civil penalties."s9 
Since these citizens act as private attorneys general, rather than 
conventional plaintiffs, such civil penalties are payable to the U.S. 
Treasury. 60 
The maximum effiuent limitations of the NPDES target "point 
sources" - which the Clean Water Act defines as "any discernible 
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged."61 The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to 
adopt elaborate regulations that govern the issuance of permits. 62 
Further, detailed guidelines direct the course of the BP A's promulga-
conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the 
Act]." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(l) (1988). 
55. Section 1342(k) of the Clean Water Act provides: 
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance, 
for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 
and 1343 of this title, except any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title for a toxic 
pollutant injurious to human health. 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1988). See also Ohio v. United States Dept. ofEnergy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1061 
(6th Cir. 1990) ("Once a state water pollution law is approved, compliance with the state law is 
compliance with the Clean Water Act."), cerL granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
56. See infra section 11.B for an explanation of state-operated NPDES permit programs. 
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c), (g) (1988). 
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988). Section 1251 of the Clean Water Act, stating congres-
sional goals and policy, notes the importance of public participation "in the development, revi-
sion, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effiuent limitation, plan, or program 
established •.• under this chapter •••• " Such participation "shall be provided for, encouraged, 
and assisted by the Administrator and the States." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1988). Several success-
ful citizen suits demonstrate the value of this enforcement mechanism in curbing pollution by 
private enterprises. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duff'ryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990). Indeed, this avenue of redress is even avail-
able against the federal government. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 
1991); supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). 
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988); see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 14 n.25 (1981) (civil penalties assessed in Clean Water Act citizen 
suits are payable to the federal government); cf. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 
1058, 1069 n.4 (6th Cir. 1990) (Guy, J., dissenting) (penalties under RCRA citizen suit provision 
payable to the United States), cerL granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
61. 33 u.s.c. § 1362(14) (1988). 
62. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122, 123 (1990). 
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tion of such regulations. 63 In sum, the Clean Water Act established a 
complex apparatus to enforce rigid maximum efiluent limitations on 
point sources where an immediate ban on pollutant discharge is im-
possible. The NPDES permit process converted these efiluent limita-
tions and related standards into obligations enforceable against 
pollutant dischargers through both administrative and judicial action. 
B. The Apportionment of Permit Authority 
Administration of the NPDES permit process has never been dele-
gated exclusively to the federal BP A. In its declaration of purpose for 
the Clean Water Act, Congress stated its policy "to recognize, pre-
serve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... "64 Accordingly, Con-
gress incorporated several provisions in section 1342 empowering the 
BP A administrator to authorize states to operate their own individual-
ized permit programs. 65 A state wishing to assume administration of 
the NPDES program within its borders must "submit to [the EPA] a 
full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish" 
and verify that state laws authorize the proposed program. 66 State 
control of the permit process is contingent upon BP A approval, but 
once such approval is secured, the BP A will suspend its issuance of 
permits and instead allow the state to oversee the operation of the per-
mit program. 67 
Although states certainly possess some autonomy in their opera-
tion of NPDES permit programs, the BP A retains control over the 
program in several important respects. First, a state's freedom to de-
sign a permit process that suits its needs is constricted from the outset: 
the BP A must approve the state's proposed program before the state 
can implement it. Moreover, the prospect of BP A disapproval extends 
beyond the initial transfer of the federal program to state operation. 
An EPA-approved state permit program must "at all times be in ac-
cordance" with Clean Water Act provisions, 68 and the BP A retains 
the power to withdraw approval of a state permit program upon a 
determination that the program fails to comply with the requirements 
of section 1342.69 
63. For example, these regulations originally were intended to "identify ••• the degree of 
effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best practicable control technology 
currently available," 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1XA) (1988), and "specify factors to be taken into 
account in determining the control measures,'' such as cost-benefit analyses, age of equipment 
and facilities, and nonwater quality environmental impact. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(B) (1988). 
64. 33 u.s.c. § 125l(b) (1988). 
65. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(b)-(d) (1988). 
66. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(b) (1988). 
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(l) (1988). 
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2) (1988). 
69. Section 1342(c)(3) reads: 
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Besides retaining the power to review the operation of a state per-
mit program and thereafter to potentially revoke state authority to is-
sue permits, 70 the EPA also may veto a state's issuance of any 
individual permit. 71 Under section 1342, each state must provide the 
EPA with a copy of each permit application it receives and notify the 
EPA of any action it intends to take on the application.72 No permit 
will be issued "if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of 
transmittal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to 
the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and require-
ments of [the Clean Water Act]."73 When the state's issuance of a 
given permit is arrested in this way, the EPA can issue the permit 
instead, imposing federally approved limits upon the discharger.74 
Clearly, then, while states do operate approved NPDES programs 
largely independently, the level of federal oversight and potential in-
terference is considerable, 75 supporting the characterization of penal-
ties for violation of NPDES permits as "arising under federal law." 
III. THE CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER Acr 
Interpreting the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver in 
the context of the NPDES scheme is the next step in ascertaining 
whether states may impose civil penalties on federal violators of 
NPDES permits. Current assessments of the waiver must address two 
separate issues. First, the law is now fairly well settled that the waiver 
includes civil penalties generally, as long as they arise under federal 
law. Section III.A.1 evaluates courts' reasoning in reaching that con-
clusion. Section III.A.2 then compares the Clean Water Act's waiver 
and RCRA's narrower waiver to clarify the breadth of the Clean 
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that a State is not adminis-
tering a program approved under this section in accordance with requirements of this sec-
tion, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a 
reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw approval of 
such program. The Administrator shall not withdraw approval of any such program unless 
he shall first have notified the State, and made public, in writing, the reasons for such 
withdrawal. 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1988). 
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1988). One case suggests that the EPA cannot revoke a state 
permit program based solely on the mishandling of one permit. Instead, revocation requires a 
pattern of noncompliance with federal requirements. Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 
1290 (5th Cir. 1977) (dictum). 
71. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1988). 
72. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(d)(l) (1988). 
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1988). At least one court has specifically required the EPA to 
base its veto upon a statutory provision or published regulation or guideline. Ford Motor Co. v. 
EPA, 567 F.2d 661, 671 (6th Cir. 1977). 
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (1988); see Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 49, at 876. 
75. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1067-68 (6th Cir. 1990) (Guy, J., 
dissenting), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
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Water Act's waiver and underscore the importance of the sovereign 
immunity question given the limited utility of RCRA in states' suits 
against federal agencies. Second, assuming that the Clean Water Act's 
waiver includes civil penalties, the question remains whether the civil 
penalties at issue - those imposed by states upon federal agencies for 
NPDES permit violations - arise under state or federal law. Section 
III.B.1 examines the courts' response to this question, including two 
federal court of appeals decisions reaching conflicting conclusions. 
Section III.B.2 reviews the Clean Water Act's legislative history for 
evidence of congressional intent bearing on this question. 
A. Delimiting the Clean Water Act's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
Although the early English conception of sovereign immunity was 
based on the belief that "the king could do no wrong,"76 the modem 
justification holds that the government must be protected in its day-to-
day functions from judicial interference.77 The federal government is 
free to waive its immunity, and cannot be sued unless it does so. 78 
Such a waiver must be "express"79 and "unequivocal."80 Neverthe-
less, in their endeavor to determine whether a statute contains a 
waiver, courts should not adopt a "crabbed construction"81 or require 
Congress to use a "ritualistic formula" to accomplish such a waiver.82 
Thus, with regard to state-imposed civil penalties against federal agen-
cies in violation of NPDES permits, the primary means for courts to 
determine whether Congress waived sovereign immunity is "by refer-
76. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARJES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 238 
(1765); Joseph D. Block, Note, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1060, 1060 n.2 (1946); see also CLYDE E. JACOBS, ELEVBNTII 
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMuNrrY 7, 151-55 (1972). See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTJONAL LAW § 3-27 (1988). 
77. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940) (stating that sovereign immunity 
arises, in part, from "the political desirability of an impregnable legal citadel where government 
as distinct from its functionaries may operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants"); Roger 
C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Re-
form of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. 
REv. 387, 397 (1970). The debate over the justifications of sovereign immunity, which has been 
addressed extensively in the legal literature, see, e.g., Block, supra note 76, is beyond the scope of 
this Note. Regardless of disagreement among scholars, however, the concept is well established 
in the case law. See infra notes 78-82. 
78. Block v. North Dakota ex rel Board of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) 
("[T)he United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress."); see also McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (articulating the federal supremacy doctrine), 
79. 461 U.S. at 280. 
80. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). 
81. Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984). In Franchise 
Tax Board. the Court used the term "crabbed construction" in rejecting the Postal Service's 
argument that the sovereign immunity waiver, which was limited to cases where the Postal Ser-
vice had been "sued," does not then apply to cases before administrative agencies rather than 
courts. 467 U.S. at 521. 
82. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389 (1939). 
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ence to underlying Congressional policy"83 and by selecting the "most 
natural reading'' of the statutory terminology in light of that policy. 84 
1. Judicial Construction of the Waiver Provision 
By delegating regulatory authority to states yet imposing mini-
mum federal standards and retaining supervisory power for the 
BP A, 85 the NPDES system has invited debate in the courts over 
whether the penalties imposed for violations of state-issued NPDES 
permits fall within the ambit of the Clean Water Act's sovereign im-
munity waiver. At the threshold, courts have faced the fundamental 
task of defining the breadth of the Clean Water Act's waiver itself. 
Almost all courts compelled to delineate the parameters of the 
waiver have determined that civil penalties arising under federal, but 
not state, law are included within the Clean Water Act's sovereign 
immunity waiver. 86 Although it was not clear that civil penalties were 
included within the waiver when the Supreme Court decided Han-
cock 87 and State Water Resources Control Board, 88 it became patently 
so after Congress amended the waiver provision in response to the 
Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act waivers. 89 
83. Franchise Tax Bd., 467 U.S. at 521 ("[The party's proposed] construction of the statute 
overlooks our admonition that waiver of sovereign immunity is accomplished not by 'a ritualistic 
formula'; rather intent to waive immunity and the scope of such a waiver can only be ascertained 
by reference to underlying congressional policy.") (citing Keifer, 306 U.S. at 389). 
84. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). 
85. See supra section 11.B. 
86. See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1990), 
cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Dept. ofNayy, 
722 F. Supp. 1565, 1572 (N.D. ill. 1989), on reconsideration, 151 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. ill. 1990). 
87. 426 U.S. 167 (1976); see supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
88. 426 U.S. 200 (1976); see supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra section I.B. In at least one case, however, a court refused to accept the seem-
ingly ineluctable conclusion that Congress intended the sovereign immunity waiver to include 
civil penalties. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 
601 (E.D. Cal. 1986). In MESS. a citizens' group requested that civil penalties be imposed 
against the Department of Defense because its McClellan Air Force Base allegedly violated pro-
visions of the Clean Water Act and RCRA. Calling the Clean Water Act's federal facilities 
provision "a compilation of ambiguity," the court ruled that since the statute is not clear on its 
face and since the legislative history "is of no assistance," Congress did not waive sovereign 
immunity for purposes other than injunctive relief. 655 F. Supp. at 604-05. The MESS court did 
find support for the plaintiff's position in the Clean Air Act's history, but concluded that "[t]here 
will not be a waiver brought about by implication or by bootstrapping or by borrowing." 655 F. 
Supp. at 605. 
The MESS court's narrow interpretation of the Clean Water Act's waiver has been univer-
sally rejected, and the decision itself is considered an aberration. Both the majority and the 
dissent in Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 
111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991), agreed that Congress waived sovereign immunity for civil penalties in the 
Clean Water Act. 904 F.2d at 1060; 904 F.2d at 1067 (Guy, J., dissenting). The dissenter, Judge 
Guy, also rejected the MESS court's contention that the waiver of immunity for civil penalties is 
an inadequate "vehicle to end the pollution which this country is facing," MESS. 655 F. Supp. at 
604; to that, Judge Guy rejoined, "[c]ourts need not debate Congress's sagacity •.• when its 
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In Sie"a Club v. Lujan, 90 for example, an environmental group 
sought civil penalties against the U.S. Department of Interior for fail-
ing to comply with the requirements of an EPA-issued NPDES per-
mit. 91 The federal government moved to dismiss, characterizing the 
Clean Water Act's waiver of sovereign immunity as insufficiently 
broad to permit suits seeking civil penalties against the United 
States. 92 The district court denied the motion to dismiss and instead 
granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, conclud-
ing that "civil penalties clearly are 'sanctions' within the meaning of 
the [Clean Water Act]."93 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, soundly rejecting the sole 
district court case94 upon which the government relied95 and holding 
that section 1323(a) "expressly authorizes the courts to assess civil 
penalties against federal agencies for violations of the [Clean Water 
Act]."96 While the court acknowledged some disagreement over 
whether the waiver's use of the term "requirements" includes civil 
penalties,97 it agreed with the district court that the statute's waiver of 
sovereign immunity as to "sanctions" clearly includes civil penalties.98 
The court said its holding was supported by the plain language of the 
statute;99 for example, section 1323's limitation of sovereign immunity 
to "civil penalties arising under federal law" implies that sovereign 
immunity for civil penalties already had been waived.100 The argu-
ments put forth in Sie"a Club typify those that courts have employed 
to counter federal government assertions that civil penalties are 
neither "requirements" nor "sanctions" under the Clean Water 
Act.101 
intent is so apparent from the face of the statute." DOE, 904 F.2d at 1067 n.3 (Guy, J., 
dissenting). 
90. 728 F. Supp. 1513 (D. Colo. 1990), ajfd, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991). 
91. Because the permit was issued by the EPA instead of through a state-operated permit 
program, the applicable penalties undoubtedly arose under federal law. 
92. 728 F. Supp. at 1514. 
93. 728 F. Supp. at 1515. 
94. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. 
Cal. 1986). 
95. The court noted that MESS "has not enjoyed enthusiastic acceptance" and "has spawned 
no progeny." Sierra Club, 931 F.2d at 1425; see supra note 89. 
96. 931 F.2d at 1426-27. 
97. 931 F.2d at 1426 (noting that some courts have found "requirements" in § 1323(n) to 
include penalties, citing as an example Maine v. United States Dept. of Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322, 
328 (D. Me. 1988)). 
98. 931 F.2d at 1427. 
99. 931 F.2d at 1425. 
100. The same argument can be made with regard to the qualification later in the waiver 
provision that "[n]o officer, agent, or employee of the United States shall be personally liable for 
any civil penalty .••• " 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (emphasis added). 
101. See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1990), 
cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
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2. Legislative Distinctions Between Broad and Na"ow Waivers: The 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The prevailing interpretation of the Clean Water Act's waiver to 
encompass civil penalties is fortified by contrasting the Act's language 
with the limiting text of the waiver contained in the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 102 the solid waste counterpart to the Clean 
Water Act and Clean Air Act. Because the RCRA waiver refers only 
to "requirements,"103 as compared to the Clean Water Act's reference 
to "all ... requirements ... and sanctions,"104 courts have read the 
RCRA waiver more narrowly than the Clean Water Act waiver, con-
sistently holding that civil penalties do not constitute "requirements" 
within the purview of the RCRA waiver in cases involving federal 
facilities. 105 
A recent Tenth Circuit case, Mitzelfelt v. United States Department 
of Air Force, 106 is representative. New Mexico sought to collect a fine 
from the Air Force for violating hazardous waste laws. The Mitzelfelt 
court ruled, however, that civil penalties are not "requirements" of 
state law that federal agencies must meet under RCRA, and sovereign 
immunity therefore precludes imposition of penalties on federal agen-
cies.107 The court noted that while Congress expanded the Clean Air 
Act and Clean Water Act waivers in response to Hancock and State 
Water Resources Control Board 108 to include "sanctions," under 
RCRA, "Congress continued to waive immunity only to 'require-
ments,' rather than something broader."109 
As in Mitzelfelt, courts have sometimes explicitly distinguished be-
tween RCRA and the Clean Water Act's broader waiver language, 
102. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6987 (1988). 
103. 42 u.s.c. § 6961 (1988). 
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). 
105. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to classify 
RCRA federal facilities provision as an unequivocal waiver of government's immunity to state-
imposed civil penalties); Florida Dept. of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 
(M.D. Fla. 1985) (same). But see Maine v. United States Dept. of Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322 (D. 
Me. 1988). This case held that 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) "is intended to and is effective to impose 
liability, by way of an appropriately explicit waiver of sovereign immunity in respect thereto, 
upon the United States for civil penalties imposed by state law." 702 F. Supp. at 330. Though 
the Clean Water Act was not at issue in this case, the court, in analogizing RCRA to the Clean 
Water Act, said that "in drafting .•. the Clean Water Act, Congress understood that the 'all 
requirements' language ••• included all civil penalties." 702 F. Supp. at 329. See also Elizabeth 
Cheng, Co=ent, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil Penalties Against Federal Facilities 
Under RCRA, 57 U. Cm. L. R.E.v. 845, 850-51, 854 (agreeing with Maine, 702 F. Supp. at 326-
27, that "requirements" include civil penalties). 
106. 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990). 
107. 903 F.2d at 1295; see also Donnelly & Van Ness, supra note 28, at 39 ("While [§ 6961] 
clearly subjects federal facilities to state and local hazardous waste requirements, both substan-
tive and procedural, it would seem to permit only those sanctions imposed to enforce injunctive 
relief."). 
108. See supra section I.B. 
109. Mitzelfelt, 903 F.2d at 1295. · 
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asserting that the latter waiver, which encompasses "sanctions," 
clearly includes civil penalties.110 This widely accepted distinction 
portends a growing reliance among states on the Clean Water Act in-
stead of RCRA in actions against federal agencies, making resolution 
of the Clean Water Act sovereign immunity question critical.111 
B. Defining the Origin and Nature of Civil Penalties in Clean 
Water Act Litigation 
If the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver encompasses 
civil penalties arising under federal, but not state law, as most courts 
have held, 112 courts still must determine whether to characterize state-
imposed sanctions under the NPDES permit regime as arising under 
state or federal law. The Clean Water Act fails to address specifically 
where penalties imposed for violations of state-issued NPDES permits 
fit into the waiver scheme. Section 111.B.1 discusses the most recent 
cases: two U.S. courts of appeals have differed on the question. 113 
Section 111.B.2 analyzes the legislative history of the Clean Water Act, 
which can be read to support both views. 
1. Contrasting Judicial Characterizations of Civil Penalties 
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to reach the 
question of whether civil penalties imposed by states on federal agen-
cies for violations of NPDES permits arise under federal or state law. 
110. See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1990) 
("Although Congress may have intended to waive sovereign immunity in [RCRA], the differ· 
ences between [RCRA] and the Clean Water Act make any waiver less than clear."), cert. 
granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). One exception is McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation 
(MESS) v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986). In MESS. the court reasoned, much 
like the Mitzelfe/t court, that RCRA did not unambiguously waive sovereign immunity with 
regard to civil penalties against federal facilities. 655 F. Supp. at 604. See supra note 89, In 
turning to the Clean Water Act waiver, the court concluded with little explanation that § 1323 
"does not waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties for the same reasons discussed in relation 
to RCRA •.•• " 655 F. Supp. at 604. At least one court has expressly criticized this logic. See 
Sierra Club v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 1513, 1516 (D. Colo. 1990) (Although "the MESS court relied 
largely upon its analysis of •.. the RCRA ... [t]he wording of the RCRA differs from the [Clean 
Water Act] and a conclusion that the former does not permit civil penalties should not be applied 
automatically to the latter statute."), ajfd., 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit 
likewise implied disapproval by reaching different results for RCRA and the Clean Water Act 
when violations of both were alleged in a single lawsuit. See, e.g., DOE. 904 F.2d at 1060, 1064. 
111. In many cases, those suing for violations of environmental statutes may have a choice 
among the statutes, as when a governmental facility's practices involve both hazardous sub-
stances and water pollution. See, e.g., DOE. 904 F.2d at 1059 (where Ohio alleged the Depart· 
ment of Energy's uranium processing plant improperly disposed of hazardous wastes and 
released radioactive materials into the air, water, and soil). 
112. See supra section Ill.A.I. 
113. Compare California v. United States Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988) (find· 
ing no waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to civil penalties) with Ohio v. United States 
Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding waiver), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 
(1991). 
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In California v. United States Department of Navy, 114 California 
sought civil penalties against the Navy for violating its NPDES permit 
when it discharged improperly treated waste into the San Francisco 
Bay. California argued that the NPDES provision of the Clean Water 
Act mandates adequate state authority to abate permit violations and, 
to this end, specifically requires states to include provisions for civil 
and criminal penalties in their legislative schemes. Consequently, pro-
visions approved by the EPA administrator necessarily fall within sec-
tion 1323, which subjects federal dischargers to civil penalties "arising 
under" federal law.m 
In a sketchy opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected California's argu-
ment. First, citing two statutory references to "state" operation, the 
court stated that the structure of the Clean Water Act does not sup-
port the conclusion that the civil penalties at issue arise under federal 
law.116 Section 1342, for example, requires states to submit to the 
EPA a description of the program they intend to administer under 
state law.117 Moreover, the court said, the California water pollution 
statute that sets out some of the NPDES enforcement provisions au-
thorizes the state attorney general to seek civil penalties in state supe-
rior court.118 
The Ninth Circuit also found no explicit congressional intent to 
waive sovereign immunity in this situation, reasoning that "Califor-
nia's position would essentially nullify [section 1323(a)]'s express limi-
tation of civil penalties against federal agencies to those arising under 
federal law."119 That is, the court assumed that if the waiver's limita-
tion did not apply to civil penalties imposed by states against federal 
agencies under state-operated permit programs, then the limitation ap-
plied to no penalties at all. 120 "Congress clearly did not intend such a 
result," the court concluded.121 
Finally, the court relied on a phrase from the Clean Water Act's 
legislative history indicating that state-operated permit programs "are 
'not a delegation of Federal authority,'" but that they" 'function[] in 
lieu of the Federal program.' " 122 The court failed to elaborate upon 
the meaning of these phrases in the context of the sovereign immunity 
question. As this Note concludes, however, the legislative history ar-
114. 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988). 
115. 845 F.2d at 225. 
116. 845 F.2d at 225. 
117. 845 F.2d at 225 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988)). 
118. 845 F.2d at 225 (citing Cal. Water Code§ 13386 (West Supp. 1991)). 
119. 845 F.2d at 225. 
120. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33. 
121. 845 F.2d at 225. 
122. 845 F.2d at 225 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 104, reprinted 
1"n 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4424, 4479); see infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
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gument the Ninth Circuit put forth is unconvincing for several rea-
sons, including the fact that the quoted language comes from the 
legislative history for an entirely different section than that setting out 
the NPDES.123 
In 1990, the sovereign immunity issue came before the Sixth Cir-
cuit. In Ohio v. United States Department of Energy (DOE}, 124 the 
State of Ohio alleged that the Department of Energy's Fernald, Ohio, 
uranium processing plant "improperly disposed of hazardous wastes, 
released radioactive materials into the environment, and polluted sur-
face and ground water."125 A divided Sixth Circuit panel implicitly 
rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis and found that the civil penalties 
Ohio sought to impose upon the federal agency "arose under federal 
law" for purposes of the sovereign immunity waiver. 126 Like the 
Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in DOE looked to statutory language 
and congressional intent, but found each supported the inclusion of 
state-imposed civil penalties against federal agencies.127 Specifically, 
the court observed that the legislative scheme that creates the NPDES 
system logically assumes that state civil penalties arise under federal 
law: 
The Clean Water Act mandates that the states may create their own 
water pollution laws, which may qualify to replace the requirements of 
the Clean Water Act. Upon implementing a state permit program "in 
accordance with" [section] 1342, the state assumes responsibility for pol-
lution permits on behalf of and instead of the [EPA]. The [EPA] is 
charged with promulgating the standards that state programs must meet 
to obtain approval. In order to be approved, a state law must provide for 
civil penalties. Once a state water pollution law is approved, compliance 
with the State law is compliance with the Clean Water Act.12s 
Oddly, both courts used essentially similar sources to support op-
posite results. Where the Department of Navy court stressed that state 
permit programs function "in lieu of" the federal program129 to indi-
cate a lack of federal authority, the DOE majority argued that the 
states operate the program "on behalf of and instead of" the EPA 130 
to indicate that state-imposed sanctions arise under federal law. 
Moreover, while the Ninth Circuit cited statutory references to "state" 
operation and "state" law to prove state-run NPDES permit programs 
operate within state law, the Sixth Circuit found copious examples of 
statutory language placing the state permit programs "under" federal 
123. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
124. 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
125. 904 F.2d at 1059. 
126. 904 F.2d at 1061. The DOE majority did not cite the Ninth Circuit case. 
127. 904 F.2d at 1061-62. 
128. 904 F.2d at 1061 (citations omitted). 
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
130. 904 F.2d at 1061. 
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law.131 For the most part, such semantic arguments on both sides are 
unconvincing. A more compelling argument the Ninth Circuit makes 
with regard to the statute's language, though developed in a mere sen-
tence, is that the restriction of the waiver to civil penalties arising 
under federal law would have no meaning if it did not apply to the 
penalties states seek to impose on federal agencies.132 The DOE court 
ignored this reading and concluded, almost as matter-of-factly, that 
the waiver's limitation "to civil penalties arising under federal law is 
aimed at state water pollution laws that fail to meet approval under 
the Clean Water Act."133 
Determining which of these two perspectives is correct requires 
undertaking the difficult task of discerning what Congress was collec-
tively thinking in enacting the Clean Water Act. Under the Sixth Cir-
cuit's view, Congress meant to clarify that the Clean Water Act's 
waiver does not extend to state water pollution laws, except, of course, 
those devised by states as part of the Act's NPDES system. Under the 
Ninth Circuit's view, on the other hand, Congress' exclusive purpose 
in including the limitation was to maintain federal immunity with re-
gard to EPA-approved civil penalty provisions under state-operated 
NPDES programs, even though such immunity is undoubtedly waived 
when the BP A, not the state, issues the permit. The proposal in Part 
IV of this Note compares these views in more detail and argues against 
the Ninth Circuit's reading, finding an alternative reading to be both 
logically sound and supported by case law. 
The narrow question of whether the civil penalties at issue arise 
under federal or state law also has been discussed in one lower court 
opinion. Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Department of 
Navy, 134 a case in the Northern District of Illinois, involved an allega-
tion that the Navy failed to comply with the terms of a sewage dis-
charge permit. The court initially refused to dismiss the suit because 
the plaintiff - a state agency - might possibly demonstrate at trial 
that the penalties it seeks in fact arise under federal law .135 The court 
defined broacily what it means for a penalty to "arise under" federal 
law: the state agency, the court said, may be able to show that it is 
pursuing "federally-sanctioned penalties."136 The phrase appears to 
131. In Department of Navy, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that§ 1342 "itself requires 
a state to submit to the [EPA] a description of the program it intends to administer under state 
law." 845 F.2d at 225. Contrarily, the DOE court pointed to a statement in the introductory 
section of the Clean Water Act that "[i]t is the policy of Congress that the states •.. implement 
the policy programs under sections [1342] and [1344] of this Act," (le., under federal law), and 
to the language Congress used repeatedly, such as "permit issued under Section [1342] of this 
Act ... by a State." 904 F.2d at 1061. 
132. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
133. 904 F.2d at 1062 (emphasis added). 
134. 722 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. ID. 1989), on reconsideration, 737 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. ID. 1990). 
135. 722 F. Supp. at 1572. 
136. 722 F. Supp. at 1572. 
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be far more inclusive than the Ninth Circuit's restrictive notion of 
what "arises under'' federal law.13' 
2. Legislative Intent 
Because both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits looked to congressional 
intent, an examination of the Clean Water Act's legislative history is 
appropriate, despite the increasing acceptance of theories that reject its 
usefulness. 138 Like the divergent judicial interpretations of the Clean 
Water Act, the legislative history of the Act is inconclusive as to what 
Congress intended when it restricted federal agencies' exposure to 
sanctions arising under federal law. Rather, congressional reports 
137. On reconsideration of the decision denying the government's motion to dismiss, how-
ever, the court concluded that the Metropolitan Sanitary District "still has not asserted that it 
seeks penalties for violations of standards formulated or permits issued under a state-operated 
EPA-approved program under [the NPDES] •... " 737 F. Supp. at 52. The court's dismissal of 
this count, however, seems to be based on a technicality and does not explicitly hold that the civil 
penalties do not arise under federal law. See 737 F. Supp. at 52 ("[T]he plaintiff has not argued 
that it is required to [enforce the Clean Water Act provisions] by seeking civil penalties in addi· 
tion to an injunction."). 
138. Indeed, many have urged that in all types oflitigation courts set aside legislative history 
and restrict statutory interpretation to an inspection of the statute alone. See INS v. Cardoza· 
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations 
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376 ("In using legislative materials, the 
courts create winners and losers in the legislative process: elevating the views of some and deni-
grating or rejecting the views of others. • • • By using legislative history, the courts may be acting 
in an area that should be out of bounds to the unelected branch."). But see Public Citizen v. 
United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 n.9 (1989) (It does not "strike us in any way 
'unhealthy' ••. or 'undemocratic' •.• to use all available materials in ascertaining the intent of 
our elected representatives, rather than read their enactments as requiring what may seem a 
disturbingly unlikely result •..• ") (Brennan, J.); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The 
Use of Legislative History in Constructing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. R.Ev. 277, 301-09 (1990) (arguing in favor of the use of legislative 
history). 
The leading proponent of this increasingly popular textualist view is U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textua/ism, 37 UCLA L. R.Ev. 
621, 656 (1990). For example, in the 1987 case INS v. Cordoza-Fonseca, Justice Scalia, in a 
concurring opinion, scolded the majority for looking to legislative history. "Judges interpret 
laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions," Scalia wrote, calling the majority's use of 
legislative history an "ill-advised deviation" from a "venerable principle" of statutory interpreta· 
tion. 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Textualists argue that attempts to determine what Congress intended by delving into abun-
dant legislative materials beyond the statute itself are inherently futile. See, e.g., Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing the many possible reasons a 
particular legislator may vote for an Act). Moreover, they stress that few legislators actually 
read the congressional reports courts often rely on and that committee staff members often insert 
language at the suggestion oflobbyists to influence judicial interpretation. See Blanchard v. Ber-
geron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (commenting that few legislators 
actually read committee reports); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (same). Textualists also point to the great discretion judges have when seeking sup-
port for a given interpretation from a vast array of legislative history materials. Former D.C. 
Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal once observed that citing legislative history is like "looking over 
a crowd and picking out your friends." Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of 
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term. 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983). Though 
the debate is far more complex than represented here, the textualist argument is one that favors 
giving no weight to the Clean Water Act's legislative history on which the Ninth Circuit relied. 
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provide some support for each argument. This support consists pri-
marily of general statements - most unrelated to the precise language 
at issue - from which courts can extrapolate a more specific congres-
sional intent. 
The Department of Navy court and the DOE dissent both cited 
conference report language from the 1977 Clean Water Act amend-
ments asserting that a state permit program "functions in lieu of the 
Federal program" and "is not a delegation of Federal authority."139 
This language, while providing some insight, is not dispositive for sev-
eral reasons. First, as subsequent legislative history commenting ret-
rospectively on the original legislation of several years earlier, it is of 
minimal legal significance.140 Further, the comment does not appear 
under the history for section 1342, where the NPDES program is out-
lined, but under a later section setting out the Act's system for issuing 
permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material.141 Earlier com-
mentary under the NPDES section says nothing of federal author-
ity.142 Finally, even if deemed to be an accurate view of Congress' 
intent regarding section 1342, the statements are general, made with-
out a clear context, and do not unequivocally preclude the more spe-
cific finding that sovereign immunity is waived for state-imposed civil 
penalties against federal dischargers.143 
Commentary elsewhere that supports the broader waiver interpre-
tation further undermines the view that legislative history proves Con-
gress intended immunity to bar such suits against federal facilities. In 
the Senate Report for the original act in 1972, for example, the com-
ments on section 1323, the federal facilities provision, acknowledge the 
"flagrant violations" by federal dischargers and the "[l]ack of Federal 
leadership" in controlling pollution, concluding that "[t]his section re-
quires that Federal facilities meet all control requirements as if they 
were private citizens."144 Taken on its face, this statement supports a 
broad waiver that would seemingly encompass state-imposed civil pen-
alties. For the most part, however, legislative history does not lend 
139. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 104, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4424, 4479; see supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
140. See United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."); Jefferson County 
Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Lab, 460 U.S. 150, 165 n.27 (1983); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 110 
S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("Arguments based on subsequent legisla-
tive history ..• should not be taken seriously, not even in a footnote."). 
141. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (1988). 
142. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 104, reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4424, 4471-75. 
143. The report's statement that the programs are not a delegation of federal authority may 
be an attempted preemptive strike to prevent any number of unforeseen state challenges to fed-
eral supremacy. 
144. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3733-34. 
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itself to such clear readings and the Clean Water Act is one of many 
examples where the intent of Congress is better found elsewhere. 
IV. SANCTIONS AS AN ELEMENT OF FEDERALLY 
APPROVED PROGRAMS 
If the Clean Water Act's sovereign immunity waiver is broad 
enough to include civil penalties imposed upon federal agencies for 
violation of NPDES permits, the evidence of that must come from an 
examination of the statute and the enforcement scheme it creates. Be-
cause legislative history is of limited utility,145 the "most natural read-
ing" of the statute should dictate whether the United States waived 
sovereign immunity.146 This requires close scrutiny of the statute in 
the context of the NPDES scheme. 
Under the NPDES program, pollutant dischargers do not directly 
violate either federal or state law; they violate the conditions of their 
NPDES permit.147 That permit, for the purposes of this Note, is is-
sued by the state under a program approved by the federal govem-
ment.148 A state legislature passes the sanctions at issue to determine 
how to penalize those who violate the permit. Those penalties, then, 
are a matter of state law, but required by federal law, because the 
Clean Water Act mandates the penalty provision.149 Unlike many 
laws, which take away rights and privileges, the Clean Water Act 
NPDES scheme grants rights to dischargers. The Act completely pro-
hibits pollutant discharge;150 its hybrid NPDES system, however, au-
thorizes the issuance of permits to dischargers that allow them to 
pollute up to the permits' specified limitations. Clearly, if these dis-
chargers did not have a permit and they polluted nonetheless, they 
would be in violation of federal law. Similarly, polluters who do have 
permits but discharge more than the authorized amount also are 
outside the scope of the permit. In this sense, both the penalties for 
those polluting without a permit and the sanctions for dischargers ex-
ceeding the conditions of their permits arise conceptually under fed-
eral law. 
A second statutory analysis also explains why the civil penalties at 
issue are encompassed within the Clean Water Act's sovereign immu-
nity waiver. While the congressional purpose behind limiting the 
waiver to penalties arising under federal law is obscure, the purpose 
behind the federal facilities provision overall is manifest from the lan-
guage itself. Congress responded in strong terms to the deplorable 
145. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. 
146. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1987). 
147. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). 
148. As opposed to a permit issued directly by the EPA. 
149. 33 u.s.c. § 1342(b)(7) (1988). 
150. 33 u.s.c. § 1311 (1988). 
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condition of federal facilities: "Each . . . agency . . . of the Federal 
Government . . . shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, 
State, interstate, and local requirements ... and sanctions ... to the 
same extent as any nongovernmental entity .... " 151 Congress was 
aware that it could not begin to ameliorate the nation's environmental 
predicament without implementing strong measures to hold the fed-
eral government accountable for its share of the problem. Thus, Con-
gress spoke in absolute terms, applying the waiver to "any 
requirement ... substantive or procedural," to the exercise of "any 
Federal, State, or local ... authority," and to "any process and sanc-
tion . . . enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other 
manner."152 If sovereign immunity limited states' enforcement op-
tions against these agencies, that effort would be severely diminished 
and the congressional purpose largely undermined. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's argument - that the waiver's limita-
tion to penalties arising under federal law is meaningless if not meant 
solely to confine the waiver to federally imposed, not state-imposed, 
penalties - is unconvincing. Courts have suggested the waiver's limi-
tation targets state pollution laws not approved under the Clean Water 
Act153 or not "federally-sanctioned."154 These related interpretations 
are consistent with the broad scope of Congress' waiver in the federal 
facilities provision as well as Congress' aim to completely eliminate 
pollutant discharge. Moreover, they give effect to a congressional in-
terest in confining the scope of the Clean Water Act's sovereign immu-
nity waiver to state penalties specifically mandated by the Act, as 
opposed to any pollution laws state legislatures might enact without 
federal approval. 
CONCLUSION 
Statutory interpretation is an imprecise undertaking. That is espe-
cially true in a case such as this, where the Clean Water Act's federal 
facilities provision, like so many products of congressional compro-
mise, fails to explain explicitly the rationale behind the requirement 
that civil penalties covered by the sovereign immunity waiver arise 
under federal law. Traditional rules of statutory construction, though 
often in conflict with each other and inherently manipulable, may pro-
vide some help. According to the Ninth Circuit, one of those interpre-
tive rules, which counsels against a construction that would render 
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988); see supra section I.B. 
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). 
153. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1990) (arguing 
that the waiver's limitation to civil penalties arising under federal law "is aimed at state water 
pollution laws that fail to meet approval under the Clean Water Act"), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 
2256 (1991). 
154. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Dept. of Navy, 722 F. Supp. 1565, 1572 
(N.D. ID. 1989), on reconsideration, 151 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. ID. 1990). 
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certain words or phrases meaningless, 155 weighs in favor of a finding 
that the civil penalties imposed by states upon federal agencies arise 
under state law. Unless one accepts the explanation that the limitation 
is aimed at state water pollution laws that the EPA has not ap· 
proved, 156 then, it is unclear what penalties would not arise under fed· 
eral law. The inclusion of the term in the provision would therefore be 
superfluous. 
Yet another interpretive practice carries even greater weight. That 
approach looks at a statute's words within the context and structure of 
the Act, paying special attention to its object and purpose. Under this 
approach, a statute should be given no construction that would render 
meaningless the goals of the legislation as manifested in the statute as 
a whole. 157 The Clean Water Act's federal facilities provision, with its 
emphasis on treating federal agencies exactly like private polluters, 
would be debilitated if states could not impose civil penalties upon 
federal and private violators alike. Moreover, unless the Clean Water 
Act can hold the country's worst polluter, the federal government, to 
its own environmental standards by subjecting federal agencies to 
state-imposed civil penalties, the Act's more general goal to "eliminate 
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters"158 becomes an 
impossibility. The statute's language, its structural framework, and 
the substantial federal control maintained over states under the 
NPDES scheme all support this Note's conclusion that such penalties 
do arise under federal law and thus are within the sovereign immunity 
waiver. 
155. See California v. United States Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988). 
156. See supra note 153. 
157. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca· 
nons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 V AND. L. RBv. 395 (1950). 
158. 33 u.s.c. § 1251 (1988). 
